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Introduction 
 
The two rows of students, seated on beige chairs with a desk attached to the base, focused 
intently as I wrote the oft-quoted, and grossly oversimplified, opening sentence of the American 
Declaration of Independence:  
 
When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the 
political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the 
powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of 
Nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they 
should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.1  
 
I circled the words, “one people.” Two arms, one well-built and the other slender, shot up. Both 
students stared intently at the blackboard. The first to speak, an articulate white man, questioned 
the legitimacy of the claim that the writers of the Declaration, as a group of white slave-owning 
statesmen, employed the term in a manner that was not only exclusionary but also undermined 
the strength of their argument within the document. An African-American man of robust 
constitution, who had patiently waited for his turn, nodding in agreement as his fellow student 
spoke, responded with an alternative reading of this phrase within the authors’ argument. He 
acknowledged the hypocrisy of claiming to speak for the people while tacitly espousing the 
legitimacy of slavery, a practice that is heinous and antithetical to the historical and 
contemporary understanding of political freedom; however, the fundamental commitment to 
political equality, he argued, untethered from the unsatisfying lack of congruence between the 
authors’ argumentative position and their actions, remains intact within this document, providing 
                                               
1 Richmond, Goff, The John Dunlap Broadside: The First Printing of the Declaration of Independence. 
(Washington: Library of Congress, 1976), 24 (emphasis mine).  
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a powerful framework to better understand our patrimony, considering the fact that this 
document is the bedrock of the egalitarian commitment engendering the United States of 
America. 
In retrospect, it became clear to me that our understanding, as a collective within the 
classroom, was constructed by the range of interpretations that surfaced in response to the 
Declaration; however, by allowing for the space to agree, contest and refute each others 
interpretations, our understanding was in fact the result of a reconstructive process. One people, 
in the first sentence of the Declaration, was initially understood to imply the American people 
represented solely by the authors of the document. The students then scrutinized this perspective 
and subsequently diagnosed the racial undercurrents that functioned through the dividing, not 
unifying, phrase “one people.” The nuanced reading that emerged following the discussion of the 
aforementioned interpretations, led to the recognition of the hypocrisy of the statesmen who had 
not only drafted the declaration but also had simultaneously preserved the revolutionary nature 
of the sentiment of equality that openly declared itself independent from the rule of the British 
Crown. The severance of ties with an oppressive force was only possible due to the bridging of 
ties between those who declared the “causes which impel them to the separation.”   
The dialogue had developed with several students, all contributing partners in the shared 
activity, listening and responding to the various readings of this phrase situated within the first 
sentence of the Declaration. The socio-historical backgrounds of the students, often introduced in 
the form of anecdotal evidence to bolster their readings of the text, imbued our dialogue with 
textured meaning emerging from a pool of diverse hermeneutical resources. The eclectic 
collection of interpretations, during the discussion, interacted in order to produce a co-created, 
and still contested, meaning of the phrase, one people, and its relation to the broader argument of 
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the Declaration. The bell rang and the correctional officer briskly marshalled the inmates in the 
Eastern Correctional Facility back to their cells. This tutoring session, as part of the Bard Prison 
Initiative (BPI), concluded underscoring, not the end of the dialogue or our understanding, but 
rather a mere pause in a reconstructive process of dialogue, sharing and co-creation.2  
As I left the facility, reflecting on the experience to which I was both a participant and a 
witness, I realized that the classroom holds a privileged status as being a dialogic space where 
human beings of different social backgrounds interact with each other in order to expand the 
horizons of their world. As children, we are privy to the environment of our immediate family. 
The medium within which we grow is determined by our parents or guardians and so we submit 
to the elders in our world because they nourish us nutritionally and educatively. When we reach 
the age when the formal process of education begins, distinguished from the markedly 
unstructured mode of living prior to enrollment in a school, our world changes.  
When we enter the classroom, a space designated for education as an autonomous 
practice, argue scholars across a range of academic disciplines, two parallel shifts occur.3 It is 
noteworthy that this view of education is presupposed by currently serving poliical figures as 
well.4 First, the broadening of our experience, in terms of the students we interact with, owing to 
the fact that we discover, through sharing, the worlds from which they have entered this 
                                               
2 The course, for which I served as a Writing Fellow, was Symbolic Logic: Critical Reasoning in 
Everyday Life, taught by Professor Daniel Berthold. This course was taught, as part of the Bard Prison 
Initiative, during Fall 2017. 
3 Thomas, Piketty. Capital in the Twenty-first Century. (Cambridge Massachusetts: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2014), 57-64. Piketty, an economist, considers education to be a practice based 
on rule-following that aids in the “diffusion of knowledge,” overseen by the structures that facilitate the 
educative process.   
4 Trump, Donald J. "President Donald J. Trump’s State of the Union Address.” The White House, January 
30, 2018. In this address, President Trump said: “Let us open great vocational schools so our future 
workers can learn a craft and realize their potential. Let us invest in workforce development and job 
training.”  
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environment. Second, having built bonds only within our family or with intimate social similars, 
the bridging between students from different social worlds occurs. Although one may argue that 
an assumption that all familial bonds are homogenous is problematic, as well as the fact that 
bonds between students often evolve into a form of kinship that may transcend the depth that was 
never felt within familial bonds, it is not my concern here to delve into the nature of the bonds.5 
Considering the reasonable observation that the origin of familial bonds and those built between 
students in a classroom are dissimilar, even though they may ultimately converge over time, it is 
crucial to recognize both the difficulty and the profound necessity, at this time, to cultivate these 
linkages between students thereby expanding their world.  
Social structures, like the school within the purview of institutionalized education, form 
the basis by which we have organized our experience through patterns of association. 
Historically, we have chosen to send children, following the widespread implementation of 
public education, to a specific place, apart from society, in order to be educated. Parents, for 
generations, have decided that socializing within the classroom is beneficial and children 
socialized in school are better prepared to enter life after graduation. Consequently, the school, 
as a space to build ties between students, metonymically represented by the classroom, occasions 
a critical outlook on the kinds of associations forming within the educative environment.  
Social Capital, the term employed by scholars old and new, filters the nature of 
association through the lens of social networks and the sharing of resources.6 This term is 
exported beyond its disciplinary boundaries by a variety of scholars but its provenance, when 
                                               
5 Ronald, Burt, Nan, Lin, and Karen, Cook. Social Capital: Theory and Research. (New York: Routledge, 
2017). For a discussion on the nature of bonds and ties, within the frame of ‘social capital,’ please see this 
collection of essays on the nature, operation and implications of social capital on learning.  
6 Pierre, Bourdieu. "Forms of Capital." In Sociology of Education: A Critical Reader, by Alan R. 
Sadovnik and Ryan Coughlan, (3rd ed. New York: Routledge, 2016), 83-97. 
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applied to education, is located in the writings of Pierre Bourdieu.78 The salient features of his 
concept for my purpose can be explained as follows: i) Social networks do not emerge 
organically and ii) Individuals develop through their social networks, by receiving, giving and 
sharing information pertaining to a pool of hermeneutical resources that traverses academic, 
occupational and even personal boundaries; however, there are types of linkages formed within 
such environments.910 Principally, we understand three types of associations. Bonding ties, 
which are typically the strongest in their tenability, are the associations that connect families and 
close social similars to one another. The limits of your world are defined by these bonds. In 
contrast, bridging ties, which are generally weaker than bonding ties, connect people across 
demographic categories including, but not limited to, race, class, occupation, age, religion and 
the like. Linking ties are the vertical associations between people at different levels within a 
hierarchy, as seen within organizations that distinguish between employees via designated titles 
and roles. Bridging ties, as opposed to both bonding and linking ties, are the hardest to cultivate. 
Bonding ties, by the nature of the evolution of associations within families, sustain themselves; 
bridging ties are an epiphenomenon of a social structure, emerging within spaces, like the 
classroom, that allow diverse people, charting their own course, to intersect, share and co-create 
meaning.  
                                               
7 It is an uncontested fact that the first organized, contemporary analysis of social capital was provided by 
Bourdieu, who defined the concept as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked 
to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance 
or recognition.” A rudimentary version of the conception was mentioned in his brief “Provisional Notes” 
that can be found in the Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Socialesin, published in 1980. The first 
English translation, concealed in the pages of his writings on the sociology of education, were left 
thoroughly unexamined until the turn of the 21st century. 
8 Alejandro, Portes, "Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology." Annual Review 
of Sociology 24 (August 1998): 1-24. 
9 Bourdieu, 86. 
10 Danielle, Allen, “A Connected Society,” Soundings: Politics and Culture, no. 53 (2013): 103-13. 
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The genealogy of education, conceptualized by a titanic voice within the discourse on the 
Philosophy of Education, John Dewey, employed the development of tribes as the lasting image 
that charted the evolution of education. Contemporary thinkers, like Danielle Allen, having 
continued the dialogue in light of this image, have attempted to unearth, and reconstruct, the 
genealogy of education when understood as a social, autonomous practice. For Dewey, although 
he did not employ the language of social capital, and Allen, who has picked up this register as a 
result of her interdisciplinary method, education seeks to not only expand the world of each 
student but also treats this expansion as an outgrowth of the bridging ties fostered between 
students. Bridging ties expand a student’s world and are fundamental to the educative process, 
properly understood. 
Schools, for example, are social structures that, if properly organized, would bring people 
from diverse backgrounds together. As a consequence, such schools become an environment for 
the cultivation of bridging ties. A society that is able to engage in the reconstructive process of 
dialogue, as seen in the prison, characterized by the co-creation of new worlds, must promote the 
development of bridging ties through the associational experience of education. However, the 
current condition of education, in the American context, paints a bleak picture.  
The foundation of the current discourse on education is grounded in the funding and 
distribution of a ‘good’ called education. The Common Core State Standards, as a set of shared 
goals stipulated by the federal government, considers education to be a “stepping stone” towards 
joining the workforce in a competitive global marketplace.11 The lexicon of economic 
commodities instrumentalizes education due to its tacit assumption that education is a means to 
an occupational end. It treats education as an individual possession deposited by a school, via its 
teachers, into the student, viewed as a receptacle, as opposed to a shared possession which 
                                               
11 Danielle Allen, Education and Equality. (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2016), 4. 
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emerges through dialogue. It has been the economists and politicians who have dominated public 
discourse by focusing on the distributive questions in relation to education.12 The basis of their 
conception of education as training so as to enter the workforce has neglected the dialogic and, 
by extension, democratic nature of the educative process. Furthermore, this 
compartmentalization of the educative process, represented by the unilinear process by which 
information is deposited into the student, oriented towards securing employment, prevents the 
fostering of bridging ties. The positive vision of a truly democratic education that comes closer 
to realizing the fundamental egalitarian commitments, held by the drafters of the Declaration of 
Independence, unmoored from their discriminatory personal choices, emerges from the coupling 
of two philosophers, separated by a century, yet bridged by a common recognition of the 
profound necessity of dialogue, sharing and co-creative participation: John Dewey and Danielle 
Allen.  
In his Democracy and Education, written as a textbook to study the philosophy of 
education, we are given his genealogical explanation that tracks the development of education as 
a fundamental process of life itself. The explanation of the elder, mature members of the tribe 
inculcating the customs and norms of their tribe into the younger members has often been read as 
a form of social reproduction. If the dominant habits of a community are transmitted to the next 
generation, then a reasonable assumption upon reading this text in particular, as influential 
Dewey commentators such as Nel Noddings and Robert Westbrook have furthered, is that this 
indiscriminate transmission of information leads to continuity, not change.1314 The reinforcement 
                                               
12 Danielle, Allen, and Rob Reich, Education, Justice, and Democracy. (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2013), 12. 
13 Robert, Westbrook "Democracy and Education." In John Dewey and American Democracy. (Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), 150-95.  
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of the traditions of the past, communicated, or rather imposed upon the immature members of the 
tribe supports a model of education that will preclude those very individuals from questioning 
and reconstructing the structures outside of the school as a collective. The treatment of each 
student as an individual being educated qua individual is presupposed in these criticisms of 
Dewey. In contrast, being educated as a collective through their associations, in response to 
presented subject matter or otherwise, signifies an inalienable facet of Dewey’s philosophy of 
education, jettisoned by the assumption that education is a process that initiates a relationship 
with each student, independent of the other students participating in the process. Although the 
above mentioned criticism has its merit, in terms of prompting further scrutiny of Dewey’s text, 
its conservative outlook misses the broader, defiantly radical, implications of wholeheartedly 
embracing Dewey’s understanding of education as life itself. 
In Education and Equality, published last year, Danielle Allen provides a fresh, and much 
needed, perspective on the intrinsic relationship between education and equality. She diagnoses 
the attenuation of education by the social justice theorists and economists who instrumentalize 
education, as the means to “alleviate poverty and secure employment” respectively.15 This 
realization prompts Allen to reconstruct our understanding of education from the perspective of 
the student being educated. She argues for an educative model oriented towards the cultivation of 
the expressive ‘capacities’ within each student.16 According to Allen, the ability to articulate a 
viewpoint and dialogue with harmonious or conflicting positions generates shared meaning 
through the interactions between students.17 These capacities, once honed, empower students to 
                                                                                                                                                       
14 Noddings, Ned. "Dewey's Philosophy of Education: A Critique from the Perspective of Care." In The 
Cambridge Companion to Dewey, edited by Molly Cochran. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 242-64.   
15 Allen, Education and Equality, 12. 
16 Ibid., 42. 
17 Ibid., 44. 
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develop and express their views thereby preparing them, in the long run, to participate politically 
following their departure from school and bridge ties across social cleavages.  
Her interdisciplinary method, drawing from political philosophy, sociology and 
educational research, has been regarded with both admiration and skepticism. In particular, her 
account of learning in the classroom has been regarded as susceptible to, what I label as, the 
“structuralist critique.”18 Briefly, the critique encapsulates the worry that meaning generated 
through the interactions between individual agents, students in Allen’s case, is not consonant 
with the structuralist premise that meaning is generated by the interaction between agents and the 
structure of the practice, such as education, within which the agents are situated.  This line of 
criticism questions Allen’s notion of the creation of shared meaning between students. Further, 
the broader implications of the critique involves three interconnected results: i) the conspicuous 
lacuna left if Allen either accepts the structuralist critique or disavows this fundamental 
component of her theory of meaning; ii) the erosion of Allen’s understanding of education as a 
form of preparation, and iii) the inability of her theory of meaning to “support our capacity to 
bridge with those different from ourselves in order to preserve the democracy which we are a 
part of.”19 John Dewey’s philosophy of education, as the antecedent of Allen’s work, avoids the 
structuralist critique by grounding his theory of meaning with the notion of the educative 
environment as constituted by the students’ associations within it, rather than separate from it as 
seen in Allen’s theory; by treating the educative process as one that involves participation within 
a group as opposed to a process that occurs between the institution and the student as an 
                                               
18 Tommie Shelby, “Justification, Learning and Human Flourishing” in Education and Equality. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016), 54. Shelby’s critical response gestures towards the tension 
between the “social-theoretic” assumptions behind Allen’s account and a structuralist understanding of 
practices. 
19 Allen, 43. 
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individual; and fundamentally by embracing the profound, yet pithy, conception of education, 
not as preparation for life ahead, but as a form of living. 
Chapter 1 delineates Dewey’s genealogical argument. By specifying the moments where 
Dewey’s critics have suggested that the notion of education as transmission engenders a cyclic 
reproduction of customs and norms, I will provide a reoriented view of his communicative 
theory of meaning in order to address these scholarly concerns. His theory of communication 
serves as a precursor to his theory of meaning that will be subsequently outlined. When the 
Deweyan approach towards meaning is understood as a result of association, it becomes plain 
that it is the educative process, not the outcomes, that define his philosophy of education. 
Chapter 2 introduces Allen’s theory of meaning. The contours of her argument are 
sketched following which the susceptibility of her claim to the ‘structuralist’ critique is made 
explicit. The implications of Allen’s understanding of education within a preparatory paradigm, 
and oriented towards fostering bridging ties, are eroded by the structuralist critique. 
Chapter 3 begins with illustrating the manner by which Allen’s theory of meaning, as 
well as her democratic and egalitarian goals, are safeguarded by inserting Dewey’s theory of 
meaning within the frame of her argument. Allen’s theory of meaning is fortified by the 
Deweyan understanding of the educative environment, the treatment of education as a process 
that occurs within a group as opposed to an individual student and the shifting of the origin of 
meaning from the intersection between the structure and agent to the associations between 
students. The capability to bridge ties across social cleavages, in light of this reconstructed vision 
of education is enhanced.  
Although it is Dewey’s conception that is buttressing Allen’s account, important 
questions raised by the latter in relation to the evaluation of growth within education, 
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unaddressed by Dewey, highlights the fact that both these architects of democracy and education 
clarify our understanding when treated symbiotically. Mirroring the educative process, a 
bridging tie between Dewey and Allen, scholars arising from dissimilar social backgrounds and 
existing within socio-historically dislocated moments, allows us to conceive of a democratic 
ideal of education, properly understood.   
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Dewey and Meaning 
 
 
The Critique of Continuity  
 
Dewey’s genealogical argument, tracing the evolution of education through the image of 
the tribe, often invoked when tracing the development of education as a process, leads to the 
centrality of communication, meaning and dialogue within his philosophy of education. This 
section will: i) underline the indispensable elements of his anthropological account of the 
emergence of education, ii) present salient objections of Dewey’s image as a form of social 
continuity, and iii) respond to the objections by providing an alternative interpretation of his 
understanding in relation to the relationship between students and their environment within the 
school. 
There is a marked difference, which every adult who has received a formal education can 
attest to, between the educative process that occurs when living, associating with others and the 
deliberate education of the young. In the former case, education is incidental, arising from 
unfettered dialogue between human beings but it is not the primary reason prompting the 
association. When formally directed into the school, as a social institution, ideally motivated to 
expand the boundaries of the students’ worlds, students are introduced to the rules of a structure; 
however, it is critical to recognize that the informal forms of association, prior to the entrance 
into school, primarily involves bonding ties sustained by familial relations. When a student 
arrives in school, the diversity of perspectives occasions a broadening of their world by the fact 
that they share their worlds. Dewey considered this intrinsic condition of association between 
human beings as a foundational aspect of his genealogy of education.20    
                                               
20 John Dewey, “Democracy and Education” in John Dewey, the middle works, 1899-1924 Vol 9. 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008), 9. 
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   His argument, given the image of tribe as the primordial constituent of human 
communities, highlighted the necessity of education due to the asymmetric relationship between 
the elder members of the tribe and the younger, immature members who required instruction in 
order to preserve the customs of their community. As the gap between the capacities of the 
young and the concerns of the adults within the tribe widened, learning by direct sharing between 
the adults and the children became increasingly difficult without any social structure. In 
actuality, Dewey argued that there was not, in fact, “any such thing as the direct influence of one 
human being on another, apart from the use of the environment as an intermediary.”21 
Consequently, a designated place for learning was sought in order to initiate a formal process of 
learning, a practice that has become commonplace. This partitioning of space, which divorced 
the process of schooling from living, precipitated a reigning orthodoxy within the philosophy of 
education, still prevalent today, that education is preparation for life after successfully graduating 
from the academic medium, which Dewey had resisted.  
Dewey’s prescience can be seen in his diagnosis of the precarious transition from natural 
associations to formal schooling:  
 
There are conspicuous dangers caused by the transition from indirect to formal education. 
Sharing in actual pursuit, whether directly or vicariously in play, is at least personal and 
vital. Formal instruction, by contrast, easily becomes remote and dead, or abstract and 
bookish.22 
  
Dewey recognizes the manner by which association, prior to the transition to formal schooling, 
preserves the vitality of interaction. It is evident that the inordinate focus on content, which 
Dewey referred to as “subject matter,” weakens the animating pulse of pedagogical pursuits 
unrestrained by structures. The contrast between the vitality of indirect association and 
                                               
21 Dewey, 33. 
22 Ibid., 9. 
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deadening practices bespeaks his commitment to ‘play,’ as a form of living that embraces the 
uncertainty of orientation when humans engage with each other. Schools designed syllabi, 
structured courses and produced subject matter in order to emphasize the contrast between 
schooling and living.  
In particular, the development of subject matter, in light of teaching students within 
formal education, resulted in the isolation of academic content from the experiences beyond the 
confines of a classroom. When technical information, in the sciences, or conceptual apparatus, in 
the humanities, are presented to students, the interconnectedness of these pedagogic symbols 
with life, outside of school, and the manner in which different students make sense of the subject 
matter is often ignored. Therefore, this attenuated form of education, which Dewey designated as 
‘ordinary,’ displaces the vivifying strain of sharing interests between students, instead focusing 
on the dissemination of information through historically agreed upon, and thoughtlessly 
recycled, systems of signs and symbols.  
Hence, a salient and persistent problem with which the philosophy of education has to 
cope, and continuously revisit across generations, is the method of maintaining a proper balance 
between the informal and the formal; “the incidental and the intentional modes of education.”23 
This unwieldy transition, often handled with a pernicious lack of sensitivity, is a 
watershed moment in Dewey’s genealogical reconstruction charting both the genesis and the 
development of education, as defined by the instrumental role played by communication prior to, 
during and after the transition.  
Human beings live in a community owing to the interests that they share in common. 
Communication, as conceptualized by Dewey, was the means by which the tribes, as the 
primordial communities, bonded due to the familial ties that branched outward. To share 
                                               
23 Ibid., 10. 
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common interests, a division of cognitive labor concomitant with the pursuit of conjoining aims 
was essential; however, such features of a community cannot be apportioned to its members, as 
one would distribute a commodity or good. Communication of the aims orienting a community, 
like a renewable resource, does not preclude participation or ownership by the fact that a few 
people possess these intellectual resources. By contrast, it is through communicating the shared 
goals of a community that participation is ensured and every individual member of the tribe is 
aware of their common interests, strengthening the bonds within the community.  
Dewey, drawing from a symbol of the Industrial Revolution, the machine, neatly 
distinguished between a group of individuals and a community: 
  
Individuals do not even compose of a social group because they all work for a common 
end. The parts of a machine work with a maximum of cooperativeness for a common 
result, but they do not form a community. If, however, they were all cognizant of the 
common end and all interested in it so that they regulated their specific activities in view 
of it, they would form a community. But this would involve communication. Each would 
have to know what the other was about and would to have some way of keeping the other 
informed as to her own purpose and progress.24 
  
It is evident that the giving and taking of orders, analogous to the functions fulfilled by the parts 
of a machine, modifies actions and results; however, this does not in and of itself inspire a 
communication of interests and, in turn, a sharing of commonly held purposes. Cooperativeness, 
which is the alignment of a goal imposed by a system outside of the agent working to fulfill the 
goal, occludes the members of this group from fostering a community, properly understood. The 
classroom, as one of the remaining spaces for the interaction of diverse perspectives in a 
sustained manner, can only become a community when bridging ties are cultivated by the 
sharing of interests.  
                                               
24 Ibid., 5. 
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Although Dewey adopts the register of bureaucracy, as seen by his use of the term 
‘regulation,’ the organic emergence of community, within the classroom, does not require a 
structure in order to initiate association. Human association is an ineliminable feature of our 
condition, requiring dialogue and sharing to recur; however, this recurrence of social interaction, 
which is a plainly observable aspect of Dewey’s genealogical argument, has been employed 
against Dewey’s position as a means to effect change.  
Robert Westbrook and Ned Noddings have both, in separate texts yet interwoven by their 
common interest in the implications of Dewey’s philosophy of education on societal change, 
recognized the value of inheriting Deweyan thought in the twenty-first century; however, they 
also realized two ‘distressing’ features of his position on the recurrence of interaction as the basis 
for change. Westbrook writes:  
 
Dewey considered the question of education and change to be a task for us; however, he 
does not offer a plan or design to realize his vision. In fact, his discussion of the machine, 
with several interacting parts working towards a common result, as dissimilar to the 
interactions within class is undermined by his recognition that the elders of his imagined 
tribe, when educating the immature members, may not consider the interests of the young 
as worth exploring. It would seem that the machine, with “maximum cooperativeness,” 
reinforces patterns of actions and similar outcomes but ensures a result that will not defy 
expectation, illustrating a congruence between the motivations of education within the 
tribe as consistent with the goals met by the cogs of a machine.25  
 
Westbrook expresses the dissatisfaction with the evasion of a prescriptive response to the 
question, repeatedly raised by Dewey, pertaining to the vision of democracy and education he 
himself continuously advocated for. This concern, raised by a variety of scholars in response to 
Dewey’s Democracy and Education, is valid; however, if we return to the motivation that guided 
Dewey’s hand as he wrote the text, explicated in his Preface, we recognize that this text was “an 
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endeavor to diagnose the problems facing education in nominally democratic societies.”26 
Although I share the dissatisfaction that arises when a conceptual vision for a democratic ideal of 
education is presented without concrete steps to realize this vision, it is critical to recognize this 
text in particular as, not a manual for the execution of a plan, but rather a companion that 
advocates for dialogue, sharing and participation when engaging in questions of education in 
relation to the text itself. This aspect of Noddings’ and Westbrooks’ objection remains 
significant owing to the fact that, as inheritors of Deweyan thought, our ‘task’ involves the 
realization of these ideals in practice; nevertheless, the second aspect of Westbrooks’ criticism is 
not only apposite to the concerns of this project but also delineates a dominant strain of 
interpretation that considers Dewey’s educative model as a form of social continuity. 
Westbrook connects the working of the machine, an image utilized by Dewey in his 
discussion of community and change, to the idealized conception of a Deweyan community 
wherein individuals share interests and thus function symbiotically with the achievement of these 
goals in mind. Although Dewey employed the machine as a counterpoint to his understanding of 
an organic community, with each member aware and actively interested in other members’ 
activities, Westbrook reads the ‘cooperativeness’ within the interconnected parts of a machine as 
a form of interaction that aligns with the Deweyan image of the tribe. The elder members, when 
educating the immature members of the tribe, are motivated by the preservation of the tribe 
impelling their decision to teach the younger members about the customs and social norms of the 
tribe.  
Westbrook recognizes that Dewey considered “working towards a common end” to be an 
insufficient condition to create a community, which supported the use of the machine as an 
analogy illustrating several members of a process, albeit mechanistic, oriented towards a 
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common goal; however, building upon this recognition, Westbrook returns to the Deweyan 
image of the tribe in order to highlight the fact that not only were the elders educating the young 
with the motivations of communal preservation and socio-cultural inculcation in mind but also 
that the interests of the young, in contrast to Dewey’s understanding, are invariably ignored not 
by choice, but rather by circumstances. The genealogical argument, employing the image of the 
tribe, must account for the consonance between the educative practices within it and the 
functioning of the parts of a machine. Furthermore, this observation buttresses the interpretive 
stance that casts Dewey’s educative model as a form of social reproduction, oriented towards the 
maintenance of a certain course determined by the elders of the tribe without consideration for 
the interests of the community being educated.  
By recognizing the fundamental assumption, acknowledged by Westbrook, that education 
only occurs indirectly through the environment, a response to the aforementioned objection 
materializes.  
For Dewey, the environment is the means of educative influence. The teacher, directly or 
without an intermediary, does not provide the stimulus within a classroom; the environment 
generates stimuli.  
Dewey’s concept of an educative stimulus is interactive, illustrated by the relationship 
between students and their environment. Stimuli are salient factors in guiding educative activity. 
They are not, however, important as causes of action for this presupposes that the students are 
inactive beings; the students are already active, and the stimuli arise and are experienced in the 
course of educative activities. Dewey writes:  
 
The painful heat of an object stimulates the hand to withdraw but the heat was 
experienced in the course of reaching and exploring. The function of the stimulus is – as 
the case just cited illustrates – to change the direction of an action already going on. 
  
  Joshi 19 
Similarly, a response to a stimulus is not the beginning of activity; it is a change, a shift, 
of activity in response to the change in conditions indicated by a stimulus.27  
 
Although Westbrook connected Dewey’s notion of the community with the machine, 
cooperating in service of a common goal, the nature of a genuinely educative stimulus as 
opposed to a signal sent to the interlinked parts of a machine abrades the understanding of 
Dewey’s educative model as a form of social reproduction. As illustrated above, a stimulus is a 
factor that introduces a sensation that changes the conditions of the environment. The student, 
within the educative medium, responds to the stimulus through a change in her activity. In a 
machine, the mechanism requires a causal chain where identical stimuli are producing expected 
responses in order to carry out the process; students, in a classroom, are independent and form 
bridging ties with their peers in a manner that, unlike the cogs of a machine, cannot be 
automated. Although the goal of a machine and a Deweyan community align in their need for all 
the members to work towards a shared goal, the fostering of such an interest must arise from 
dialogue and participation, not the programming by an individual that imposes aims external to 
the agents involved in the process.  
The interactive nature of a stimulus also reflects the ability of a Deweyan environment to 
avoid the critique of social reproduction by realizing, and promoting, the non-linearity of the 
educative process. The machine, as Westbrook explained, reinforced “patterns of action.” These 
patterns, following a set of prescribed rules requiring specific responses, flows in a linear 
manner. By contrast, the Deweyan notion of a stimulus allows for responses, prompted by 
changes within a students’ course of events, not to achieve an externally imposed goal, but rather 
to walk their own way in the general direction shown by the teacher. The student, unlike the inert 
elements of a machine, can dialogue with the medium within which she is present and, as we will 
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see in the next chapter, can interact with other students who essentially constitute the Deweyan 
educative environment. By sharing, dialoguing and responding, the interaction between students 
may still fall into patterns of association; however, as these pattern arise, not from the imposition 
of an aim external to the students, but rather from the sharing of interests within the community, 
the educative process is truly reconstructive as it builds upon its past in order to progress towards 
a changed future.  
This iterative process wherein students share their diagnoses of the world, in response to 
subject matter, realizes the reconstructive vision that Dewey hoped to see in the classroom. 
Although communication is the means through which community forms, it is integral for our 
purposes, as it was for Dewey, to highlight the significance of meaning, as the passenger within 
the vehicle of communication. If communication is the circulatory system, through which blood 
is pumped across the body, meaning is the oxygen being transported that initiates, sustains and 
renews the life of the organism, that is society.  
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Communication and Participation: 
 
If we are to dutifully understand democracy and education as fundamentally 
reconstructive, a delineation of his understanding of communication, at this point, would be 
particularly instructive.  
All natural events, Dewey averred, are subject to reconsideration and revision; creation 
and recreation are concomitant with dialogue, and are achieved through dialogue. Although 
philosophers of education, old and new, have circumscribed communication, through language, 
within the academic environment as distinctly educative by the fact that it is “shaped by the 
practice of education,”28 Dewey resisted this philosophical propensity. 
Social interaction and institutions have been treated as the products of a ready-made 
specific physical or mental endowment of a self-sufficient individual. Dewey, in contrast, argued 
that the world of inner experience is dependent on an “extension of language which is a social 
product and operation.”29 Language itself is a natural function of human association and its 
expressions react with events, physical or human, creating meaning. The prevalent conception of 
communication, which persists even today, is that the process of communication acts as a 
mechanical intermediary to convey observations and ideas that have a prior and independent 
existence. Dewey, for the means of his philosophy of education, apropos to this discussion, 
reoriented the view of communication in reconstructive terms. 
Communication, for Dewey, was the establishment of cooperation in an activity in which 
there are partners, and in which the activity of each is modified and regulated by the partnership 
itself. The process produces meaning that is shared between two dialoguing individuals. He 
                                               
28 Noddings, 78. 
29 Dewey, 125. 
  
  Joshi 22 
explained communication as a process in which person A and person B coordinate their actions 
in the following way such that: 
  
B’s understanding of A’s movement and sounds is that he responds to the thing from the 
standpoint of A, that is perceiving the thing as it may function in A’s experience, instead 
of simply egocentrically.30 
  
In this situation, B responds to the meaning of A’s movement and sounds, rather than to 
the movement and sounds itself. Similarly, A conceives the thing not only in relation to herself, 
but as a thing being grasped and handled by B. She sees the thing as it may function in B’s 
experience. This view of communication, as a form of meaning-building, led Dewey to the 
conclusion that meaning is a property of association. The distinctively cooperative aspect of 
communication, the occurrence of which is independent of the physical environment within 
which it is structured, involves not only the co-creation of meaning but also the sharing of this 
meaning. Consequently, we develop an understanding of communication, beyond its 
conventionally transactional iteration, involving the exchange of expressive content, as a 
distinctly cooperative process that effectuates a common understanding and the sharing of a 
common world.    
A question, worthy of our attention, is the need for Dewey’s comprehensive theory of 
communication as opposed to the formulation of a theory of instruction or learning. The problem 
of education was framed as, neither being about individual development nor about adaptation to 
the existing social order, but rather as the coordination of the individual with the associative 
aspect of learning through communication. The central question for Dewey, inherited by Allen, 
was: how can meaning be communicated? 
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Although he initially argued that education consists primarily in “transmission through 
communication,” he recognized the need to clarify that it is not a process of “direct contagion or 
literal inculcation.”31 Communication, properly understood, is a process of sharing experience till 
it becomes a common possession. As a consequence, the central educational mode is 
participation.  
Participation, within this vision, is neither achieved by physical proximity or the situation 
in which all merely work towards a common end. It is only when all are cognizant of the 
common end and are interested in it that participation is realized. Furthermore, it is only this kind 
of participation which modifies the disposition of every partner who undertakes it. Education, in 
light of this notion of communication, does not emerge from simply being in a social 
environment but rather by sharing a social environment. A human being, connected with other 
beings, cannot perform her own activities without taking the activities of others into account as 
they are the indispensable conditions for the realization of each partner’s tendencies. The co-
creative facet to Deweyan communication is foundational to the development of a community of 
partners, whilst accounting for individual development that occurs through association. 
This vision of communication, when applied to the distinction between education and 
training, further demonstrates not only the notion of development through association but also 
the capability of education to expand beyond the confines of its structural environment.  
Training is illustrated by situations in which those who learn do not share in the use to 
which their actions are put. They are, in Deweyan terms, not a partner in a shared activity. 
Education, in contrast, requires the sharing of a common activity within which every partner is 
both participating and interested in its accomplishment. A partner’s ideas and emotions are 
changed as a result of the activity. Dewey explains: 
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One does not merely act in a way agreeing with the actions of others, but, in so acting, 
the same ideas and emotions are aroused in oneself that animate the others.32 
  
It is not, therefore, that meaning is transmitted from one person to another. It is because 
partners share in a common activity that their ideas and emotions are transformed as a result of 
and due to the function of the activity in which they participate. The co-creation of meaning, as 
the term suggests, is made through association. The recognition of this distinction highlights the 
fact that a common understanding is not a condition for cooperation. It is not that we first need to 
come to a common understanding and then proceed to coordinate our actions. It is precisely the 
other way around: common understanding is produced by and is the outcome of successful 
cooperation in action.  
Dewey considered the mutual intelligibility of the sounds of language to be sufficient 
evidence in support of the premise that meanings depend upon connections with a shared 
experience. Let us consider the manner by which an adult understands the word ‘book’ as 
opposed to the phonetic explanation by which each syllable within the word is explained to a 
child. The word ‘book,’ unbeknownst to the child prior to her learning of its meaning, and 
employed by the adult, acquires meaning through its use. Thus, the word ‘book,’ used by the 
adult and child in a common experience, within which both partners are interested in the activity, 
exemplifies the sharing of meaning through dialogic participation. 
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Meaning and Co-Creation: 
 
 
The Deweyan understanding of communication figured into a social framework for his 
theory of meaning. While participation in a joint activity is central in Dewey’s account of 
communication, he emphasized the importance of the role played by things – both the things 
around which action is coordinated and the sounds and gestures that are used in the coordination 
of action. It is often argued that a person learns in the following manner: 
  
         By merely having the qualities of things impressed upon his mind through the 
gateway of the senses. Having received a store of sensory impressions, associations or 
some power of mental synthesis is supposed to combine them into ideas – into things 
with meaning.33 
  
However, the meaning of stones, trees or the fruits which hang from its branches is not to be 
found in the things themselves. As a matter of fact, it is the characteristic use to which the thing 
is put that supplies the meaning with which it is identified. Thus, to share the same ideas about 
things that others have is to attach the same meanings to things and to acts which others attach, 
which is precisely brought about through communication, through conjoint action. 
         The significance of Dewey’s communicative theory of meaning is found in a rejection of 
the idea that the child can simply discover the meaning of the world – and of the things and the 
events in the world – through careful observation of the ‘outside.’ The meaning of the world is 
not located in the things and the events themselves, but in the dialogic associations in which 
things, gestures and sounds play a role. We could, thus, say that because meaning only exists in 
association, it is, in a sense, located through the interactions between partners in a joint activity. 
This is why communication is not about the transportation of information from person A to B, 
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that is fundamentally transactional in its nature, but is properly understood through participation. 
Further, if it is the case, as Dewey argues, that meaning exists in association, then it follows that 
meaning can only be represented in and through association.  
For education this implies, inter alia, that we should approach questions about dialogue 
and meaning in terms of the representations of practices not only within the walls of a school but 
also beyond the physical confines of an academic structure. This means, for example, that the 
teaching of a software in a professional environment or the instruction of history within a 
museum should involve bringing the practice of mathematics, computer science, history and 
anthropology, among other things, into view as these are distinctly educative processes 
regardless of their environment. The compartmentalization of the educative process as realizable 
only within a practice untethered from the world neglects the fundamental role played by 
education in our socio-cultural development, as evidenced by the genealogy of education itself, 
when properly understood. 
         Dewey’s theory of communication, concomitant with its embrace of the ubiquity of the 
educative process, engenders profound implications for how we understand teaching and the 
impact of the teacher on the student.  
The idea of communication as participation underscores the fact that the teacher’s effect 
on the student is not direct, but indirect. Teaching is not a kind of input that is simply installed 
into the mind of the student without any noise, disturbance, transformation or resistance. 
Teaching, in contrast, is constituted by the construction of a social situation and the effects of 
teaching only result from the ways in which students interact with the social situation.  
One may wonder: who actually educates? The intuitive response would dictate that 
educators educate, which is, in essence, true. However, if it is the case that there is no direct 
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relationship between the activities of the educator and the learning of the student, that teaching is 
not direct input into the minds of the students, then the conclusion must follow that it is the 
social situation which emerges from the interaction between the teacher and student that really 
educates. Dewey succinctly argues that we never educate directly, but indirectly by “means of 
the environment.”34 
Dewey’s ideas about the social origin and ‘location’ of meaning also imply that reflection 
itself has a social origin, in that reflection only becomes possible once one is able to make a 
conscious distinction between things and their possible meanings. The difference between an 
adjustment to a physical stimulus and a mental act, Dewey argued, is that the latter involves a 
response to a thing in terms of its meaning whilst the former does not. This imbues one’s 
behavior with a mental quality and it is only when one has an idea of a thing that one is able to 
respond to the thing in view of its place in an inclusive scheme of action. It becomes possible, 
then, to foresee the drift and possible consequence of the action of the thing upon us and of our 
action upon it. This makes the transition, or rather the evolution, from action to intelligent action 
possible for Dewey, a significant realization within the scope of his educational philosophy. 
Dewey, as we should by now acknowledge, approaches education first and foremost as a 
process of communication. Contrary to the long-standing tradition in educational theory and 
practice, Dewey’s theory does not focus on questions about teaching or instruction as such. He 
does not conceive of education as something that is done to children and students instead of with 
them. However, Dewey does not fall onto the opposing extreme on this spectrum, which would 
be an adherence to a theory of learning that only looks at the activities of ‘learners’ without the 
influence of the educative medium.  
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Dewey acknowledges the pivotal role of the activities of the student in the educational 
process; nevertheless, the configuration of this process as a process of communication – of 
participation in a joint activity – is the central notion animating his philosophy. It is not a child-
centered approach, but rather a philosophy of education oriented towards the emergence of 
communication and dialogue as a natural process of evolution. Consequently, if learning takes 
place through participation and communication, then the role of the learner changes from a 
recipient of meaning to a creator of shared meaning.  
The engagement of the student in education, as opposed to training, implies that 
education is no longer, as the detractors of Dewey aver, a purely reproductive process but is in 
fact a reconstructive process achieved through the new meanings and insights generated by the 
participating and dialoguing students. Although this philosophy of communication can never 
guarantee social harmony or peaceful coexistence, and it would be naïve to place such an 
expectation upon it, the strength of this position emerges from its championing of interaction and 
engagement over the self-evidently less preferable isolation and disengagement. As linguistic 
and co-creative beings, it is the sharing of meaning through educative dialogue, beyond the 
conception of education as an autonomous practice within a structured environment, that will 
secure, not agreement, which should not be the aim of our educative process in any case, but 
rather healthy, and profoundly necessary disagreement, contestation and, at times, consensus.  
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Allen and Meaning 
 
Logic and Structure:  
 
Allen’s conclusion, that meaning is produced by the interaction between students, is 
preceded by three distinct, yet interwoven, conceptual steps. They are: i) the application of the 
Rawlsian distinction between actor and practice, in his Two Concepts of Rules, to the case of 
education; ii) the import of structuralist assumptions in her account of the practices which fall 
under the institution of education; and iii) her explanation of the logic of the practice of 
education in the classroom. 
Rawls, in his Two Concepts of Rules, argued that the debate among penal theorists 
between a utilitarian justification, aimed at deterrence, and a retributive justification, based on a 
commonplace morality, derived from a failure to understand the logic of practices.35 He argued 
that, for any given practice, there is a distinction between “justifying a practice and justifying a 
particular action falling under it.”36 Allen transposes this distinction to the case of education.37 
Thus, the distinction becomes a case of understanding why education, as a formal institution, is 
justified vis-à-vis why educating an individual is justified. 
Allen proceeds, from this distinction, to provide her account of the emergence of a 
practice. She utilizes the analogy of a baseball game: 
  
Take the game of baseball for example. The emergence of the game as a social practice is 
explained by the goal of leisure. But the actions of the individuals participating in the 
game – swinging at balls, running around bases, catching and throwing balls, are justified 
by the goal not of leisure but of scoring more runs than the opponent. And the actions of 
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corporate actors who have co-opted the game of baseball to develop, for instance, a 
professional version of the sport are justified by the goal of profit.38 
  
According to Allen, the goals that explain the emergence of the practice (‘leisure’); the 
goals that justify the effort to regulate the practice (“the rules of the game”); and the goals that 
justify actions undertaken within the practice (“swinging at balls, running around bases”) are all 
logically separate.39 If such logics turn out to be identical, Allen considers such a coincidence as 
purely accidental. Consequently, it is imperative that we recognize that, as with the case of 
punishment in Rawls, the logic of education makes two different types of justification relevant to 
the practice. Therefore, as with the “corporate actor” who converted the practice of baseball into 
a money making franchise, appreciated by millions of people in America, the co-optation of 
practices by the state can have a utilitarian justification; however, the goals of the actions within 
the practice do not necessarily have to be utilitarian. Allen suggests that, for the case of 
education, the goals of the particular instances of teaching that fall under the practice of 
education are ‘eudaemonistic.’40 
Although her account of Aristotelian eudemonism is complex, for the purposes of this 
Chapter, a brief definition will suffice. Allen defines eudemonism as an ethical outlook 
organized around the efforts of individuals to achieve their “full human flourishing by means of 
the development of their internal capacities.”41 She continues to explain the method by which 
students, through their interactions, fulfill the eudemonistic goal of education by creating 
meaning:   
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For a democratic society, the egalitarian potential of education, in the creation of 
meaning through deliberative forums within the practice of education, will animate the 
potential of political participation.42 
  
Allen’s theory of meaning is constituted by two salient features: reflection and 
expression. Each student, in their dialogic interaction, expresses a viewpoint and attempts to 
internalize their counterparts’ expression. Reflection precedes understanding as, Allen notes, 
“the mediating influence of the teacher prompts further inquiry in order to achieve 
understanding.”43 The process by which meaning is shared involves the cyclic exchange between 
the interacting students which continuously refines and reshapes meaning. It is both an iterative 
and reconstructive process; however, another associated, and critical, feature of her theory is the 
framing of the dialogue within the confines of the educational structure. 
The practice of education is the ‘architecture’ within which the deliberative activity takes 
place.44 The educative medium, for Allen, is located in the dialogic relationship between students 
from which meaning emerges; however, the students, as they interact, are engaging, in parallel, 
with the structure of the educative practice.45 This structure, defined by the walls of the 
classroom, the formal criteria of the educative task or the rubric by which the students are 
assessed, modulates the behavior and actions of the students. Although the interaction between 
student and structure is not explicitly recognized by Allen, it is picked up by the those who, in 
reference to her work, articulate the structuralist critique.46 
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The Structuralist Critique: 
 
Prior to the reconstruction of the structuralist critique, I will outline two salient 
assumptions in structuralist thought, rule-following and social fields.47 I will then illustrate the 
integration of these concepts in Allen’s project following which I will present the structuralist 
critique. Subsequently, I will explain the implications of this line of criticism on not only Allen’s 
theory of meaning but also, by extension, on her overarching argument related to the egalitarian 
potential of education. Following the consideration of a conceptual pivot that Allen could 
employ in order to circumvent the structuralist critique, I will underscore the conspicuous lacuna 
in her argument left by this pivot.  
Allen’s understanding of education as a practice originates from structuralist assumptions 
unearthed by commentators on her text.48 One of the salient features of structuralism within the 
field of education, apropos to this discussion, is the emphasis being placed upon physical 
experience as well as intellectual experience within the classroom.49 Simply, in the case of the 
classroom, an analysis of the interactions of the students within the spatial structure of the 
practice, the concrete walls of the classroom, must be accompanied by the interactions of the 
students with the normative structure itself. Normative structures, as the name suggests, are 
constituted by the rules which guide the actions of the agents within the practice. More precisely, 
the influence exerted by the structure upon the behavior, whether physical or linguistic, of the 
agents, students in Allen’s case, provided the basis for the structuralist concepts of rule-following 
and social fields. 
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Rule-following can be understood as a disposition of the mind with twinned functions. As 
an instrument that structures observations into patterns of associations, the mind understands a 
practice, such as the workings of a classroom, by observing and thereby acquiring the rules that 
regulate the class; as a responsive tool, the mind, having learned the rules of the practice, adapts 
to the structure in order to guide their actions and behavior within the practice. In essence, rule-
following is the way individuals learn to behave and navigate the practice within which they are 
situated. 
This learning involves an interaction with the structure. To substantiate, in the context of 
Allen’s argument, a student would, upon observation, realize that raising one’s hand during a 
discussion is a sign of readiness to express oneself. This is a case of the rule-following 
disposition acquiring the rules of the practice. If a student, who is quick-witted and formulates 
their thoughts swiftly, raises their hand constantly so as to increase the frequency with which 
they speak, their behavior has been modulated by the structure in order to accelerate their 
learning, presuming that speaking more often does in fact generate a faster understanding of 
ideas. 
The disposition by which humans follow rules is an intrinsic form of conditioning that is 
regulated by the rules of a practice.50 Such structuralist concepts presuppose complete obedience 
to the rules, not a “free interaction” with them that would allow for individuals to associate with 
each other through the framework of the practice within a social field.51 
Rule-following is produced through an interaction of the individual with the rules of the 
game of different social fields. Scholars, often in their explanation of social fields, like Rawls 
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and Allen in their accounts of practices, employ the analogy of a game.52 A social field is any 
practice with its own set of rules, accepted behaviors and norms. The school is often cited within 
explanations of social fields.53 An individual would, through experiencing the rules within a 
social field, develop their rule-following disposition in order to adapt to the practice within 
which they were located. As a consequence, the agent-field interaction, used interchangeably 
with agent-structure interaction, results in the individual’s learning through the acquisiton and 
subsequent use of the rules that structure the practice. 
Allen’s theory of meaning originates from these structuralist assumptions undergirding 
the sociological theory of practice. This observation, made by Allen’s early commentators, forms 
the basis of the structuralist critique.54 Students, as the agents within the social field of a 
classroom, learn through their dialogic interactions. The social field, with its rules, frames the 
deliberative activities that engender the opportunities for meaning to emerge from dialogue; 
however, it is foundational to the structuralist position that the agents, in this case students, first 
acquire the rules of the practice, independent of interpersonal interaction. Allen, who explicitly 
acknowledges the provenance of the social theory enlivening her account as structuralist in 
nature, must import such foundational features within the context of her argument.55 This stage 
of learning, generated by an interaction between student and structure, precedes the dialogic 
exchanges that produce meaning within Allen’s account. The rule-following propensity develops 
by learning the rules of the practice and thereby modulates its behavior and actions in response to 
the structure within the practice. However, this propensity cannot create meaning through an 
interaction with another agent in the social field; the dispositional tendency creates meaning 
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solely through an interaction with the normative structure itself. This is the fundamental premise 
of the structuralist critique. Allen’s theory of meaning requires students, as agents within the 
same social field, to have the capacity to generate meaning through dialogic interactions between 
each other. However, having imported a structuralist social theory, Allen’s theory of meaning 
cannot generate meaning through interactions between students as it is only by the interactions 
between a student and the structure of the practice of education through which meaning can 
emerge. 
By employing a structuralist theory of practice, as the grounding for Allen’s theory of 
meaning, she imports, according to the structuralist critique, the aforementioned premise that 
meaning is generated, not by interaction between students, but rather by interactions between 
students and the normative structure framing the practice of education. However, Allen’s 
diagnosis of the inordinate prevalence of structures within education in the American context is a 
cause of the instrumental treatment of education.56 
This finding is evidenced by her research into the structures guiding students’ normative 
behavior. Allen highlights the presence of assessments, standardized testing and internal systems 
of monitoring and evaluation which characterize the social field of education today.57 It is only 
with these structures, argues the dominant logic of the current education system, that students 
recognize the normative standards of behavior and performance, learn the rules of the practice in 
order to meet these standards, and modulate their behavior when they have violated a standard. 
A conspicuous example is the Value-added model (VAM) of teaching.58 It is a collection 
of complex statistical techniques that uses multiple years of students’ test score data to estimate 
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the effects of individual schools or teachers. This model directly effects salaries of the teachers in 
schools. In light of this model, several teachers instrumentalized the normative structures, the 
rules, of the practice to produce higher test scores.59 The students respond by learning the rules 
of the “game of schooling” in order to satisfy the criteria for ‘success.’60 The rules of the 
practice, involving assessment, grading criteria and examinations, have not changed; however, 
the educative activities have been shaped to achieve increases in test scores, not the creation of 
meaning through deliberative forums. 
The structuralist critique, instantiated by VAM, illustrates the students’ inability to create 
meaning through interactions between each other. The structuralist account of education as a 
practice enabled agents, within social fields, to generate meaning by interacting with the 
structure of the practice. Allen’s theory of meaning, grounded in structuralist practice theory, 
argues for meaning through interactions between the students within the practice, not through 
interactions with the structure itself. For the case of education, within Allen’s context of 
American education, the reality evidences the role of external influences, such as policy makers, 
to inhibit the creation of meaning through dialogue. Allen, cognizant of this reality, locates the 
origin of meaning through an interaction between students; the structuralist critique highlights 
the necessary condition that meaning can only be created through an interaction between student 
and structure. 
It becomes clear that Allen’s theory of meaning, undergirded by structuralist theory, is 
susceptible to the structuralist critique. Her theory of meaning, which is grounded in an 
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understanding of shared meaning as generated between students, would be bolstered by an 
alternative foundation in a theory that understands meaning as generated between students, rather 
than via an agent-structure interaction. Allen, who cites John Dewey’s philosophy as her 
intellectual ancestor, would profit from his theory of meaning that avoids the structuralist 
critique.61 
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A ‘Deweyan’ Environment and the origin of Meaning: 
 
Allen situates her philosophy of education as an extension of Dewey’s project in 
Democracy and Education. Although Allen does not explicitly utilize Deweyan concepts in her 
argument, she acknowledges that her “method is pragmatist” in its spirit.62 Considering the 
difficulty of responding to the structuralist critique in Allen’s theory of meaning, Dewey’s theory 
of meaning, which circumvents this line of criticism, with harmonious overarching goals for 
education in a democratic society, would fortify Allen’s account. 
In the opening chapters of Democracy and Education, Dewey focuses on the question: 
how can meaning be communicated? Dewey argued that “education consists primarily in 
transmission through communication”; however, he qualified this assertion, as we saw in 
Chapter 1, by highlighting that this process does not occur by literal inculcation.63 
Communication, properly understood, is a process of “sharing experience until it becomes a 
common possession.”64 The foundational element of the educative process for Dewey, and Allen, 
is participation. 
Participation, for Dewey, is not constituted only by the physical proximity of the students 
within an activity. His notion of participation is defined as follows: 
  
It is only when all are cognizant of the common end and all are interested in it that there 
is real participation. It is only this kind of participation which modifies the disposition of 
both parties who undertake it.65 
  
From the account above, it becomes clear that participation, through communication, 
requires a shared interest in the common end of the activity itself as well as a modification in the 
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disposition of all the partners engaged in the dialogic activity. This account of Deweyan 
communication figures into his theory of meaning by emphasizing, in conjunction with 
communication, the dialogic manner by which communication with the world itself produces 
meaning.66 
It is often argued, as Dewey noted, that a person learns merely by having the qualities of 
things impressed upon his mind through the gateway of the senses. Having received a store of 
sensory impressions, associations or some power of “mental synthesis” is supposed to combine 
them into ideas, “into things with meaning.”67 However, meaning is not to be found in the things 
themselves. It is, as Chapter 1 elucidated, the characteristic ‘use’ to which the thing is put which 
supplies the meaning with which it is identified.68 
From this account of meaning creation, it is evident that meaning only exists in social 
practices. It is the dialogic interaction between both the practices and students, as well as the 
students themselves, that generate meaning. At this point, one could contend, and plausibly so, 
that this account looks similar to the structuralist account of practice theory imported by Allen. 
The crucial step, which completes Dewey’s theory of meaning, is his final premise: the 
environment within which meaning is created is the discourse itself.69 
In accordance with the structuralist account of practices, the structure of the practice, 
constituted by its rules, is regarded as separate from the interactions between students. The 
interactions between students is contingent on the interaction between each student and the 
structure. The interaction between students, independent of the structure, in terms of the 
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Our Educational Prospect by David T. Hansen. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 23-
40. I am indebted to Biesta’s account of Dewey’s theory of communication which figures into his theory 
of meaning. 
68 Dewey, 34. 
69 Ibid. 
  
  Joshi 40 
structuralist account, is not possible. In contrast, the interactions between students, for Dewey’s 
account, is the structure or, as Dewey would say, the educative medium. 
The educative medium, or environment for Dewey, was conceptualized as follows: 
  
A being whose activities are associated with others has a social environment. The 
particular medium in which an individual exists leads him to listen and feel one thing 
rather than another…it gradually produces in him a certain disposition of action. The 
words “environment,” “medium” denote more than the surroundings which encompass an 
individual. Water is the environment of fish because it is necessary to the fish’s activities 
– to its life.70 
  
The Deweyan environment, by contrast with structuralist theory, conceives of the 
environment as both vivified and vivifying. The social environment, constituted by the 
communicative exchanges between its inhabitants, is itself active. This dynamic environment 
stimulates the students within it by the expressions of the participants within the activity. The 
analogy between the necessity of ‘water’ to the life force of a fish and the necessity of dialogic 
exchange to the life of the educative medium evinces the fact that meaning is produced, 
sustained and continuously reconstructed by dialogic action. 
The structuralist critique questions the students’ ability, within the structuralist account of 
practices, to create meaning through interactions between each other. The necessity of the 
interaction between student and structure as the mediator in order to generate meaning abrades 
against Allen’s theory of meaning which proposes the creation of meaning between students. The 
Deweyan account, which shifts the structure of the practice from being independent of the 
participants to being constituted by the participants themselves, circumvents the deleterious 
implications of the structuralist critique. Dewey’s theory of meaning creation, as generated by 
the interactions between students, remains intact in light of the structuralist critique. 
                                               
70 Ibid., 11. 
  
  Joshi 41 
If Allen, within the context of her argument, were to reconstruct her understanding of the 
structure of social practices along Deweyan lines, she not only bypasses the structuralist critique 
but also salvages the broader implications of her argument. The egalitarian potential of 
education, achieved through the generation of shared meaning and dialogic interactions between 
students, is achievable for Allen, when coupled with Dewey’s theory of meaning. Further, 
Allen’s reconstructed account would be further fortified against the associated lines of criticism 
in relation to the structuralist critique. Principally, the notion that what students learn most 
effectively, during their time within the social field of school, is the practice of schooling itself, 
that is, how to “play the game of schooling” by interaction, not necessarily with other students, 
but chiefly with the rules of the structure guiding their activities.71 By envisaging the normative 
structure as the participants of the educative activities themselves, Allen’s account, with the 
context of American schooling in mind, can better fulfill its aim of shifting the instrumental 
treatment of schooling to the participative mode so as to attain her ‘eudaemonistic’ goal of 
education, properly understood. 
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Democracy and Education in Motion 
 
Education as Preparation or Living: 
 
Dewey and Allen are unified by their commitment to both democracy and education as 
the requisite foundation in order to initiate change within society; however, their concepts of 
education bifurcate in a manner that powerfully represents two dominant concepts within the 
philosophy of education. Dewey treated education as life itself; Allen considers education as 
preparation for living. This stark contrast, like two branches stemming from a single tree, remain 
rooted to the development of the expressive capacities of the student. Fostering bridging ties, 
across social cleavages, a fundamental objective for both the architects of democracy and 
education, prompted an emphasis on the process of co-creating meaning as a way of expanding 
the worlds of the participating students. Through dialogue and the sharing of interests, both 
Dewey and Allen envisioned a democratic ideal of education, properly understood, but their 
fundamental understanding of education itself differed. One wonders, and rightly so, why this 
point of divergence? A critical, and potentially devastating, consequent question remains: whose 
conception realizes the goal of fostering bridging ties better?  
In this closing Chapter, in order to put forth a positive response to the aforementioned 
questions, three interwoven steps will be delineated: i) an explanation of the implications on 
Allen’s theory of meaning when fortified by the Deweyan conception of the environment; ii) an 
illustration of the productive tension that emerges between Dewey and Allen’s conceptions of 
education; and iii) a brief formulation, in light of the positive contributions by both the architects 
of democracy and education, of an educative vision that will better cultivate bridging ties in the 
classroom.   
  
  Joshi 43 
Allen’s argument, as the previous chapter illustrates, locates the origin of meaning at the 
intersection between students and the structure of a school. A student’s engagement with the 
rules of the structure produces a response from which meaning is derived. When viewed as an 
autonomous social practice, education is understood as separate from life beyond the four 
classroom walls, apart from the patterned interactions mediated by the academic structure. 
Allen’s argument, which embraces this assumption, rests upon the necessity for educational 
practices to have surfaced in an enclosed space specifically designated for the deliberate 
educating of the young. This separation of the educative environment from the world outside of 
its circumference is vital to her view.  
As a consequence of this retro-concocted picture tracing the genealogy of education, 
Allen, unlike Dewey, who also employed the image of the tribe, furthers the reigning orthodoxy 
within the philosophy of education that life and education are fundamentally separate 
experiences; education is a stepping stone that prepares students for life after graduation. Dewey, 
as seen in Chapter one, recognized the ineluctable dangers of transitioning from living to formal 
education, preempting the attenuation of associations caused by an inordinate focus on subject 
matter. Although Dewey was not opposed to rules within the classroom, as a minimalist 
framework that preserved decorum in service of pedagogic and co-creative dialogues, he did 
remain skeptical of the modulation of behavior owing to the imposition of rules. The negotiation 
between an interaction with the rules and the ability for students to redirect themselves, in 
response to the course towards which they are constantly steered by subject matter, is a 
reconstructive, vitalizing process.  
When we invoke Allen’s laudatory aim of cultivating the expressive capacities in 
students so that they can participate in co-creative dialogues, her theory of meaning, undergirded 
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by a structuralist conception of social interactions, does not entirely miss its aim of fostering 
bridging ties; nevertheless, her account, when fortified by the Deweyan conception of the 
environment, shifts the origin of meaning from the agent-structure interaction to the associations 
between students engaging freely within the educative environment. Moreover, as the physical 
structure of a classroom, with its walls, desks and chalkboards, no longer is the educative 
medium, the associative ties between students, who themselves constitute the structure, become 
the loci for the creation of meaning. The desperate need to promote bridging ties between 
students, recognized by Allen and indispensable to Dewey’s project, is better served by a 
fortified account of her theory of meaning.  
From Dewey’s account of meaning, it becomes clear that meaning is located, not in the 
things themselves, but in the social relations in which partners dialogue so as to create shared 
meaning. Therefore, meaning exists, as we saw in Chapter 1, in association. This understanding 
of meaning is mirrored in Dewey’s explanation of democracy itself. Democracy is more than a 
form of government; it is “a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience.”72 
This rendering of democracy, akin to his theory of meaning, emerges from association and, more 
importantly, through association.     
Allen, retracing the etymological roots of the term, defines democracy as “the capacity of 
a broad and inclusive public to effect change.”73 Considering that the purpose of democracy, and 
education, in light of her definition, is to empower individual citizens and give them “sufficient 
control over their lives to protect themselves against domination,”74 the development of a 
student's expressive capacity is a sine qua non of her educative model.  
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It is reasonable, in light of the two definitions, to interlace their conceptions of 
democracy, built a century apart. The foundations of their educative model, supported by their 
common conceptualization of democracy, produces a condition where education, based on 
communication and co-creative dialogue conducted by interested participants, leads to social 
change. As Chapter 1 illustrated, Westbrook’s objection treated the Deweyan model of education 
as a form of social reproduction that merely transmitted the dominant ideas, cultural myths and 
patterned associations across generations. By embracing the reconstructive process of meaning 
creation, formulated by Dewey and espoused by Allen, students are not cogs in a machine, 
trained to respond to specific stimuli with conditioned actions; students share interests and, 
through dialogue, become the educative stimuli that propels the process of co-creating meaning. 
Allen’s theory of meaning, as we have seen in Chapter 2, which locates the origin of meaning 
between agent and structure, cannot adequately fulfill her own goal of fostering bridging ties 
between students from diverse backgrounds. 
In the classroom itself, when the origin of meaning is located in the associations between 
students, the role of the teacher transforms. The teacher is customarily the purveyor of rules, 
regulating discourse and modulating the behavior of students through interactions. These 
engagements are not associative as the teacher is merely an instantiation of the structure. When 
framed within a Deweyan conception of the environment, the teacher becomes the means of 
educative influence, teaching, not directly, but indirectly through the presentation of subject 
matter and participation in response to the students’ readings. In other words, the teacher 
educates by means of the environment. The Declaration of Independence, as we saw in the 
opening sketch in the Eastern Correctional Facility, generates meaning through dialogic 
interactions that allow particular students to associate through their interpretations of the text; 
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however, following this engagement in relation to the subject matter, the ongoing relationship 
wherein students continue to share their interests, becoming the educative stimulus for each 
other, not only promotes the cultivation of bridging ties but also strengthens existing ties. In this 
instance, education, reaching towards associations beyond the structural confines of a school, 
illustrates the potential for expanding social networks beyond the family, furnishing connections 
across social cleavages that solidify during the educative experience.  
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Bridging through Dialogue: 
The conception of education as a form of preparation, as Allen avers, is accompanied by 
her eudaemonistic motivation for each student. This eudaemonism, an ethical outlook that seeks 
to furnish an environment for the flourishing of every student, treats education as an interaction 
between the agent and structure. Consequently, each student, embodying this individualistic 
outlook towards their education, which they reproduce as they notice the school treat them as an 
individual in this process, creates meaning through interactions with the structure. To 
substantiate, as students, we are evaluated in terms of our performance inidividually. 
Consequently, the only interest that is often nurtured is the relationship between the rules, used 
to evaluate the student, and the activities stipulated in accordance with these rules. A democracy, 
as understood by both Dewey and Allen, broadly speaking, sustains itself through participation 
in dialogues where each citizen is interested in the collective’s growth. Allen’s preparatory 
paradigm, motivated by the preservation of democracy and the promotion of bridging ties, is not 
oriented in its application to the goals that animate it. Education as preparation reinforces the 
notion that students are evaluated individually so as to ready them for the manner in which 
institutions post graduation, whether they are companies or governments, will view each person 
as an individual. In this way, the preparatory paradigm conditions students to mirror the model of 
education that individuates and enumerates each child within the structure, prompting rule-
following and isolation, not unbridled curiosity and collaboration.  
Dewey, in his vision of education as life itself, wrestled with the messiness of this model. 
The students, viewed as a collective, are therefore taught as a collective. The cultivation of 
shared interests emerges from activities wherein associations, through dialogue, develop and are 
strengthened by the continuity of education.  
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Although Dewey, unlike Allen, does not lay as much emphasis on the guarantee of 
change as a result of his educative model, it is a disquieting embrace of this risk that exemplifies 
wholeheartedly accepting his radical vision. Consensus is not a precondition for communication; 
the opposite is the case. In fact, agreement is not, as Dewey attested, a guaranteed outcome 
within his associative model of education. This profound necessity to recognize the need for free 
thought and action, unfettered by excessive regulation within the classroom, is realized by the 
Deweyan environment, where education occurs by providing a course for students that occasions 
their self-initiated redirection. The empowerment of students, as wayfarers, requires the 
loosening of a well-intentioned grip so that they can choose their own path collectively. The 
pooling of diverse hermeneutical resources within a group of individuals occasions the 
cultivation of bridging ties, across social cleavages, due to the participative experience that 
students discover in school, not after.  
It is noteworthy that Allen, writing several decades after Dewey’s socio-historical 
moment, raises the persistence problem of segregation within American schools as an enduring 
conflict that erodes the conception of democracy outlined above.75 Without the lack of diverse 
perspectives in the average American classroom, not to say that racial differences are the sole 
marker by which worlds can be co-created, across social cleavages, through dialogue, we must 
realize that a prescriptive response to such conditions is desperately needed. Dewey, as noted by 
his critics, remains disappointingly unhelpful in terms of concrete steps required to realize his 
vision. Allen, by contrast, and beyond the concerns of this project yet noteworthy, has explored 
pedagogic methods, such as project learning and collaborative learning processes, in order to 
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better cultivate the verbal capacities of each student.76 The lamentable paucity of research in 
relation to the cultivation of the expressive capacities within children, with the goal of creating 
bridging ties between students, shall hopefully pave the way for avenues for research; however, 
the tragic irony in this country is seen by the fact that segregated schools severely delimit the 
capabilities of researchers to better understand our social fragmentation.77 A diversity of 
perspectives, as participants in an educative dialogue, will signal a conversational shift in not 
only how people across social cleavages understand each other but also how groups of students 
learn through association, not inordinate rule-following to which children become inured.  
From a theoretical perspective, the radical potential of embracing the Deweyan 
environment, as the foundation of Allen’s theory of meaning, will expose the policy makers and 
economists, who instrumentalize education by orienting the process towards an occupational 
end; resuscitate the dialogue, among the philosophers of education, in relation to the question of 
educating for civic participation; and provide a stable foundation for the increasing number of 
preparatory programs for teachers in America.78 When children are educated in classrooms that 
treat them as participants in a collective dialogue, where the teacher is the means of the educative 
influence, we will bridge ties as we co-create worlds. Although consensus is prized, it is not the 
primary goal. To embrace contestation, refutation and association is to recognize the profound 
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and conflictual portrait of democracy and education as fundamental to experiencing life itself, 
rooted in the present.  
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Epilogue 
 
 
The inspiration for introducing the first sentence of the Declaration, within the frame of a 
class on Symbolic Logic in the Eastern Correctional Facility, originated from Danielle Allen’s 
close-reading of the document with both her undergraduate students at the University of Chicago 
and the general public during her night classes.79 The motivation for my own pedagogic move, 
within the prison, stemmed from the inclination to furnish an educative environment that allowed 
for the sharing of experiences in relation to subject matter and thus, the promotion of bridging 
ties. In Our Declaration, Danielle Allen frames her text as both a line by line analysis of the 
content of the American Declaration of Independence and an account of the iterative drafting 
process of the document itself. Initially, her treatment of the text was, as she acknowledges, 
‘instrumental.’80 It was chosen due to its short length so as to allow for swift perusal by her adult 
students, during the night classes, in light of their busy schedules.81 However, the transformative 
experience of teaching the Declaration for Allen, and her students, served to illustrate a process 
of co-creation where meaning was shared between partners and bridging ties were strengthened. 
The dialogue within the walls of the prison, like Allen’s account of her pedagogic 
experience, demonstrates the need to participate in order to co-create a common world. Each 
participant can help to build the world in which one lives. Like an ‘architect,’ every member of a 
dialogue has the capacity to determine the pattern and structure of the ideas being discussed.82 
This democratic engagement allows for meaning to be a result of co-creation. However, it is 
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crucial that this process of co-creation, like democracy itself, continuously recurs in order to 
preserve the vitality of meaning. It is only by engaging all members of a community equally in 
the work of co-creating and constantly re-creating meaning that democracy as a form of living 
renews itself.  
The dialogue in the class at the Eastern Correctional Facility was constituted by the 
students clarifying their own principles, contesting certain readings of the text and transposing 
the ideals of the document into the current moment to diagnose the political maladies of our 
time. The reading of the document itself was interposed between these dialogic interludes. The 
experience transformed as each student contributed to a common understanding of political 
equality that was co-created through dialogue. Crucially, as the two classes, one taught by Allen 
and the other under the auspices of the Bard Prison Initiative, proceeded, the understanding of 
political equality, in response to the accretion of details as the students explored the Declaration 
further, was “constantly questioned, revised and ultimately re-created.”83 
The writing of the document itself, built upon a process which involved dialogue and the 
co-creation of meaning, figured into classroom discussion. The Declaration provided an 
exemplar for the way in which people, with ideas, conversations and decision-making 
committees could weave an agreement, through dialogue and deliberation, so as to define a 
common purpose. The version of the Declaration, approved and signed by congress, was the 
result of several layers of conversation, debate through epistolary correspondence and close 
scrutiny, by various sets of eyes, on each sentence, word and punctuation mark. Although the 
text is frequently attributed to Thomas Jefferson, regarded as the principal author of the 
document, Allen reorients this view by meticulously cataloguing the myriad official discussions, 
fifty-seven to be precise, so as to illustrate the polyvalence of voices that have shared in the co-
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creation of this document.84 This “conscious redescription” of the dialogue, writing and editing 
process that formed the basis for the Declaration inherited by every subsequent generation, 
inspired the experience of the classroom discussion of the text itself.85 There is no ultimate end 
to dialogue, only pauses to reflect on the shared meanings which emerge through collaborative 
participation. 
The instrumental treatment of education orients the process towards a final goal. Allen’s 
teaching of the Declaration, and the dialogues within the Prison, demonstrate the fact that 
certainty, whether epistemic for the social theorists or fiscal for the economists, within the scope 
of an educative process guided by a democratic ideal, is a chimeric goal. The transformative 
power of co-creation, which treats education as dialogic, allows for each student, as part of the 
body politic within the classroom, to participate in the generative process. The reconstructive 
feature of this process of co-creation prompts the participants to constantly engage in the dialogic 
mode to recreate meaning. The conspicuous lack of a definitive telos for this process, 
accompanied by the destabilizing conclusion that the conception of democracy is itself subject to 
this reconstructive process and therefore fluxional, requires educators, philosophers and scholars 
to embrace the fugitive nature of a truly democratic education.  
This democratic ideal of education teaches us to co-create, revise and reconstruct 
meaning. Democracy itself, during this process, can fail. The chimera of certainty, sought by the 
economists shaping education policy, is held onto tightly so as to avoid the acceptance of failure. 
It is noteworthy that democracy can fail; nevertheless, it is crucial to realize that this failure is 
fugitive. The democratic ideal, through its iterative and reconstructive nature, has endowed itself 
with immortality. Although it may be doomed to failure, it cannot be sentenced to death. The 
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Declaration of Independence was a memorandum, whose etymological roots tell us that it is 
derived from a Latin word meaning, “something one must remember.”86 The co-creation of 
shared meaning, by partners in dialogue, will continuously create and re-create; write and 
rewrite; construct and reconstruct; build and rebuild; and define only to redefine our shared 
course of human events. 
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